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Marvin E. Wickware, Jr.
 “And what do you do?” As a graduate student studying Christian theology 
in a country that increasingly expects education institutions to focus primarily on 
the production of tech-savvy laborers,1 this is quite an awkward question. What 
role do academic theologians play in this kind of educational system? What is the 
task of theology in this context? In pursuing answers to these questions, I return 
to one of the first works on theology I studied, written by one of my first theology 
professors: Christopher Morse’s Not Every Spirit: A Dogmatics of Christian Disbelief.
In Not Every Spirit, Morse examines the task of theology (in particular, 
dogmatics, that field of theology concerned with the faithfulness of claims regard-
ing God), and rehearses the theological work he prescribes. As I will be focusing 
on the task of theology in this paper, I will engage with the corresponding section 
of Morse’s book here. Not Every Spirit begins with Morse’s claim that “to believe 
in God is not to believe in everything.” In other words, while the emphasis in 
some churches may be on what ideas about God or authorities on God are to be 
believed, such belief necessarily implies a disbelief of other ideas and authorities. 
Christian faith is, then, a matter of “faithful disbelief.”2
Morse clarifies this notion of faithful disbelief by comparing it to doubt and 
skepticism. Doubt refers to the “distrust of God that remains present even within 
our struggles to be faithful.” Skepticism is centered on the claim that one should 
not believe something without having been presented sufficient evidence. Faithful 
disbelief, by contrast, is a matter of discerning what one is called, by faith, to dis-
believe. It is not about the distrust of God, but the distrust of what is not of God. 
It is not about the justification of belief in God, but about what that belief rejects 
as unjustifiable.3 So, while doubt and skepticism are each of value to an academic 
theologian and likely to any Christian, Morse rejects them as orientations that are 
definitive of theology, in favor of faithful disbelief.
This provisional rejection is grounded in Morse’s reading of the Bible, rather 
than in a philosophical opposition to doubt or skepticism. This notion of a call 
to faithful disbelief, as well as the title of Morse’s book, is drawn from 1 John: 
“Beloved, do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits to see whether they are 
1  See, for example, current President Barack Obama’s website, which emphasizes the role 
of education in training people for jobs and aiding in the international competitiveness of the US 
economy. http://l.barackobama.com/issues/education/
2  Christopher Morse, Not Every Spirit: A Dogmatics of Christian Disbelief, 2nd ed., (New 
York: T&T Clark, 2009), 3.
3  Ibid., 5–7.
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terms as Barth does when discussing church proclamation. According to Barth, 
human speech that presents itself as proclamation claims to be
human speech in and by which God Himself speaks like a king 
through the mouth of his herald, and which is meant to be heard and 
accepted as speech in and by which God Himself speaks, and there-
fore heard and accepted in faith as divine decision concerning life and 
death, as divine judgment and pardon, eternal Law and eternal Gospel 
both together.10
This is very similar to Morse’s notion of spirits, which are ideas passed on 
in human language by people who claim divine origin for these ideas.11 Barth is 
somewhat more specific regarding the types of speech that can claim to be procla-
mation, restricting this field to two types of speech: preaching (which can be either 
written or spoken) and sacrament. Barth takes preaching and sacrament to be the 
specific types of speech to which Jesus commissioned the church.12 Theology, the 
particular concern of this paper, is a separate task from proclamation but cannot 
be understood apart from it as dogmatic theology takes proclamation as its object 
of study.13
In order to understand how Barth relates dogmatic theology to church 
proclamation, and through that understanding to gain some perspective on the 
role of academic theology today, it is necessary to look closely at two of Barth’s 
lengthy discussions of the Word of God, the word to which proclamation claims 
to witness. In paragraphs four and five of Church Dogmatics, Barth discusses what 
the Word of God is (its nature) and how the Word of God comes to humanity (its 
forms). It is important to note that in presenting these two subjects, I will be re-
versing Barth’s order of discussion. While I will discuss what Barth takes the word 
of God to be before explicating how it comes to humans, Barth significantly takes 
the reverse approach, for a reason that should become clear shortly.
Barth discusses the nature of the Word of God under three interrelated 
headings: the Word as speech of God, the Word as act of God, and the Word as 
mystery of God. By speech, Barth means “the form in which reason communi-
cates with reason and person with person.” I take Barth to be using the term rea-
son here to refer more or less to a capacity to make meaning of things in relation 
to each other and, by extension, to all things in the world. Such definitions are 
provisional, at best, when used in reference to Barth’s work, for the same rea-
son that his presentation of the Word of God reverses mine. With that in mind, 
10  Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Volume I.1, The Doctrine of the Word of God, study ed., ed. 
G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, trans. G.W. Bromiley, Harold Knight, and G.T. Thompson, (New 
York: T&T Clark, 2010), 49. First published in German 1932–1938 by Theologischer Verlag Zürich. 
Gendered language is in the original text.
11  Christopher Morse, Not Every Spirit, 3–5.
12  Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Volume I.1, 53–55.
13  Ibid., 48.
from God.”4 It is this kind of faithful disbelief that characterizes Paul’s claim that 
love “is faithful in all things” in 1 Corinthians 13:7.5 This faithful love is shown to 
practice a “testing of spirits” in Philippians 1:9–10 and 1 Thessalonians 5:19–22, 
in which Paul closely associates love for God and God’s Spirit with the discern-
ment, in love, of what is good and of God from what is evil.6
Morse further explains faithful disbelief in contrast to what could be called 
unfaithful belief, which is marked by allegiance to those things that are not from 
God. As an example of such unfaithful belief, Morse focuses on false hope, par-
ticularly as it is rejected by Rachel, who was the mother of Joseph and Benjamin 
(the ancestors of three of the twelve tribes of Israel), according to Genesis. Rachel, 
who died giving birth to Benjamin and may have been buried near Bethlehem, 
is mentioned in Matthew’s gospel, in a quote from Jeremiah: “A voice was heard 
in Ramah, wailing and loud lamentation, Rachel weeping for her children; she 
refused to be consoled, because they are no more.”7 Morse focuses on the image of 
Rachel’s refusal to be consoled in the light of what had just been narrated in Mat-
thew, the mass execution of the children of Bethlehem by King Herod’s order. Any 
explanation that would offer comfort in such suffering through reference to God is 
rejected by Rachel. In Matthew, it is only in the coming of God into human flesh 
that there seems to be a hopeful response to Rachel’s lament. Only what comes 
from God is to be faithfully accepted; all other hopes are false and acceptance of 
their consolation is unfaithful.8
Through the notion of faithful disbelief, Morse addresses the question of 
what defines the task of Christian theology. In his view, Christian theology is 
the critical study of Christian disbeliefs, performed in the interest of discerning 
what, among Christian doctrines, is not of God.9 This view of theology will serve 
as my starting point in questioning the particular task of academic theology in 
the context I described above, in which education is primarily positioned as a 
strategic investment supporting national economic competitiveness. In order to 
think along with Morse as I consider this question, I will turn to two thinkers 
whose works together illuminate elements of Morse’s work that are particularly 
relevant to my question. Specifically, I will discuss the work of Swiss theologian 
Karl Barth as it intersects with the insights of French thinker Michel Foucault in 
order to investigate the ways in which power influences Christian understandings 
of the Word of God.
Of Barth’s many works, Church Dogmatics I.1 stands out as particularly, 
though not uniquely, relevant to an attempt to look into what Morse means when 
he discusses the “spirits” Christian theologians are to test, and how those spirits 
come to make claims upon Christians. When Morse discusses spirits, those claims 
which are to be faithfully believed or disbelieved, he writes in much the same 
4  1 John 4:1a (NRSV)
5  Christopher Morse, Not Every Spirit, 3–4.
6  Ibid., 7–8.
7  Matthew 2:18, quoting Jeremiah 31:15.
8  Christopher Morse, Not Every Spirit, 7–11.
9  Ibid., 31.
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those who hear it.18 Whenever we act, God’s decision judges the meaning of 
that action.19 God’s Word condemns our attempts to escape the divine one who 
gives us life. As God’s promise, however, God’s Word accepts us and offers us 
life even in that judgment. This status of the Word of God as an act of judgment 
and as the giving of life offers some idea of why proclamation deserves attention. 
Human words that claim to witness to the Word of God are not relaying mere 
words. They claim to point to the judgment and healing enacted by God. Insofar 
as it claims to witness to God’s action, proclamation positions itself as that which 
illuminates the claiming of humans (communally, as the Church, and individu-
ally) through divine judgment and promise. Proclamation claims to herald our 
transformation into a new humanity, a humanity that perceives the world in ways 
directed by God.20 Proclamation would tell those who hear it what they are and 
what they are becoming.
While proclamation claims to witness to the Word of God, it can never 
claim to master God’s Word, capturing it perfectly within human words. The 
Word of God, as God’s speech and God’s act, is always God’s mystery, eluding our 
firm grasp. Beyond its personal nature, which resists any capture by human words, 
the Word of God itself determines whether or not we really speak of it at all when 
we claim to do so. We cannot construct for ourselves an accurate idea of the Word 
of God over against which we can judge whether or not supposed proclamation 
has witnessed to the Word.21
That is not to say that the Word’s form is wholly foreign to us. Rather, the 
Word of God is mysterious precisely in its thoroughly worldly form. When God 
speaks through humans, God really speaks through humans, using human modes 
of address. Preaching is not only proclamation; it is human address. The Word 
of God is not mysterious solely in the foreignness of its content, but also in the 
delivery of that foreign content in surprisingly familiar form. This meeting of 
holy and secular in the Word of God can perhaps be best understood in light of 
Barth’s identification of the Word of God with Jesus Christ, in whom God took 
on human flesh.22 As in the person of Jesus Christ, the Word of God is not hidden 
behind human form, for us to cleverly detect, but takes up that humanity as its 
own form. In its secular form, the Word claims humanity for God just as God of-
fers us life through the content of the Word.23
In examining its form, we turn from a discussion of the nature of the Word 
of God (as God’s speech, act, and mystery) toward an enumeration of the forms in 
which it comes to humanity, making a transition that requires a clarification. Up 
until now, I have written of the form taken by the Word of God. Barth, however, 
actually lays out three forms in which the Word of God comes to us. The distinc-
18  Ibid., 146–147.
19  Ibid., 158–159.
20  Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Volume I.1, 150–153.
21  Ibid., 160–161.
22  Ibid., 162–166.
23  Ibid., 172–176.
though, Barth seems to say that speech is rational in the sense that both speaker 
and listener will make sense of what is said in relation to their understanding of 
the world. This speech is remarkable, if not seemingly impossible, in that it is 
between divine reason, founded in perfect understanding of the world, and hu-
man reason, built upon an understanding of the world that is distorted insofar as 
it differs from the divine understanding.14
Equally important, the Word of God is personal speech. God’s speech is 
personal insofar as that speech, the Word of God, is God’s own person. As with 
human persons, God’s Word is irreducible to a system of ideas bound in human 
language. As such personal speech, God’s Word is unknowable apart from its 
coming to us as the person of God, specifically in the person of Jesus Christ.15 It 
is this personal nature of God’s Word that explains both Barth’s choice to pres-
ent the “how” of God’s Word before its “what” and the unsuitability of seeking 
neat definitions for Barth’s chosen terminology. Barth structured his treatment 
of God’s Word as he did because the nature of God’s Word, in his view, cannot 
be understood apart from how it comes to us. Barth’s terminology eludes precise 
definition because Barth rejects the idea that he could capture the object of those 
terms, God’s Word, in neatly systematized theology.
Accordingly, we can know this personal speech of God only as speech that 
is directed toward us and not as a thing in itself. From the character of this speech 
as directed toward us, three points of immediate interest follow. First, the Word of 
God is not spoken by humans to humans. It comes to us from outside that which 
we perceive as our world as something new each time we hear it. Second, the Word 
of God, as it is spoken by the one who defines our reality, “smites our existence.” 
It challenges our perception of reality neither by answering our questions nor by 
questioning our answers. Instead, it challenges our perception of reality by coming 
to us as the ground of reality, a ground for which we have no explanation and, 
likely, no conceptual room. Third, the Word of God, as directed to us, shows us 
that God does not wish to be without humanity, but instead wishes to reconcile 
our relationship with God.16
The Word of God is not only a declaration of God’s wishes. In human 
speech, there seems to be a gap between our words and actions. What we say can 
be disconnected in time from the actions those words promise. What we say can, 
in fact, have no connection at all to what we actually do. Humans can lie and 
break promises. God’s speech, however, is itself God’s act. While humans experi-
ence a rift between even sincere words and acts such that “mere word is the mere 
self-expression of a person, while act is the resultant relative alteration in the world 
around,” God’s self-expression is the alteration that we would expect to follow 
(either chronologically or logically) that word.17
As the act of the one who defines reality, God’s Word is God’s “ruling 
action.” Through judgment and promise, the Word of God claims and binds 
14  Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Volume I.1, 132.
15  Ibid., 134–137.
16  Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Volume I.1, 137–139.
17  Ibid., 140–142.
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as something both similar to and different from it. It is similar to proclamation in 
that it is temporally bounded, being a record only of past proclamation. In report-
ing past proclamation, the Bible also witnesses to the Word of God and stands in 
a continuity of such witness with ongoing proclamation, with “Jeremiah and Paul 
at the beginning and the modern preacher of the Gospel at the end of one and the 
same series.”
However, all terms of this series are not equal. The modern preacher stands 
as the successor to and subordinate of Jeremiah and Paul, among others. She or 
he is in the presence of an authoritative teacher when reading from the Bible and 
proclaiming in light of its witness. Further, the Bible is not changed by the situ-
ation of the Church (translation would seem, for Barth, to be open-ended and 
practically necessary exegetical commentary on the Bible rather than alteration of 
it), as ongoing proclamation necessarily is. Instead, the Bible is determinative of 
proclamation. Scripture “confronts” the Church in its proclamation as the Word 
of God which is the basis of such proclamation. Ultimately, like proclamation, 
Scripture is the Word of God only insofar as God speaks through it and claims its 
hearers in faith.27
Both proclamation and the Bible witness to, but are not themselves, the 
third form of the Word of God: Jesus Christ, the Word of God revealed. The 
definitive revelation of God, by God, to humanity is the Incarnation. In Jesus, the 
full reality and glory of God took on human flesh, revealing once-for-all that God, 
wholly different from us, is with us. The person of Jesus Christ is identical to the 
Word of God revealed. It to this person, then, that proclamation and Scripture 
witness, though none of these forms of the Word of God is known to us apart 
from the others:
The revealed Word of God we know only from the Scripture adopted 
by Church proclamation or the proclamation of the Church based 
on Scripture. The written Word of God we know only through the 
revelation which fulfills proclamation or through the proclamation 
fulfilled by revelation. The preached Word of God we know only 
through the revelation attested in Scripture or the Scripture which 
attests revelation.28
The three forms of the Word of God are unknown apart from each other, 
but they are not identical and they relate to one another through what could be 
thought of as a chain of witnessing, in which Scripture is subordinate to revela-
tion and proclamation is subordinate to Scripture. That is, in the person of Jesus 
Christ, God spoke through God’s own lips. Scripture refers away from itself to 
the reality of God revealed in Jesus and is the Word of God insofar as God speaks 
through that witness to revelation. Proclamation is bound by its commission in the 
27  Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Volume I.1, 98–107.
28  Ibid., 113–118.
tion of these three forms from one another structures Barth’s discussion of the how 
of the Word of God, in contrast to its what.
The form of God’s Word discussed first by Barth is the form most explicitly 
relevant to an inquiry into theology along Morse’s lines: proclamation, or “the 
Word of God preached.” Proclamation stands in relation to the Word of God in 
four ways that are related to each other in such a way that Barth compares them to 
“four concentric circles.” First, the Word of God stands as the commission upon 
which proclamation is to be justified. True proclamation is not justified by the 
search for answers to human problems; it is founded upon a divine command that 
transcends the human motivations into which the Word of God insinuates itself. 
This relation of commission is the “outermost circle” among these relations, as each 
subsequent relation of Word of God and proclamation assumes this first relation.
Second, the Word of God is the theme of real proclamation. Speech neces-
sarily has a theme, and the various academic disciplines and forms of literature 
take the assorted objects of human perception as their themes. Objects as varied 
as subatomic particles, ecological systems, human emotions, international poli-
tics, and existential questions are each discussed by various ways of speaking. The 
theme of proclamation, however, is not primarily an object of human perception. 
Insofar as it is truly proclaimed, the Word of God is not directly perceived and 
reported by its proclaimer. Instead, it asserts itself as the theme of proclamation. 
Third, as was discussed above, the Word of God is the judgment and criterion of 
its own proclamation. While proclamation can be judged by human standards as 
far as its rhetorical elegance or clarity are concerned, there is no human test for 
its status as true proclamation. As the theme of proclamation challenges human 
perception, human judgment falls short as the criterion of proclamation. Finally, 
in the innermost circle of these relations, “the Word of God is the event itself by 
which proclamation becomes real proclamation.” Proclamation does not only find 
its commission, theme, and criterion in the Word of God. In the event of real 
proclamation, God takes on the form of human words and acts in our world mak-
ing proclamation what it claims to be.24
According to Barth, the church engages in proclamation “in recollection of 
past revelation and in expectation of future revelation,” relating to two modes of 
revelation which, as each refers to the Word of God, are identical to one another. 
This recollection is directed toward something that comes from outside the church 
and is not the recollection of a knowledge that is inherent in humanity. Insofar 
as Christians undertake such recollection, Barth argues, we turn to the Bible, the 
second form of the Word of God.25 As the written Word of God, the Bible is the 
means by which we recollect past revelation, but it is a record of and witness to 
that revelation and not the revelation itself.26
The Bible is not, then, some kind of timeless deposit of revelation, bear-
ing witness to the essence of the Church. As the means of the recollection of past 
revelation, the Bible stands in relation to the ongoing proclamation of the Church 
24  Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Volume I.1, 85–90.
25  Ibid., 96–98.
26  Ibid., 108.
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As ways of saying, statements are not reducible to “words, phrases, or propo-
sitions.” Rather, these elements of language constitute the material that is shaped 
by statements. Statements are not the products of speaking subjects. Instead, state-
ments arise from a “great murmur,” in which individual speaking subjects cannot 
be identified.35 The internet can serve as a helpful, if imperfect, analogy for this 
great murmur. Vast amounts of information circulate from person to person on 
the internet, but much of it can hardly be traced back to an individual originating 
source. We can repeat information we have read on the internet and, sometimes, 
might not remember that we had read it at all; it may seem self-evident. In a 
sense, it is as though the information we have read, but for which we have no clear 
source, speaks through us and spreads optimistic economic forecasts or suspicions 
about certain foods. Out of the great murmur, a mixture of analog and digital 
communication, arise ways of speaking that seem to naturally suit various situa-
tions in which and objects about which we can speak.
In The Order of Things, Foucault (looking at the seventeenth through nine-
teenth centuries rather than our information age) discusses a shift in the uses of 
language that illustrates the rising of statements from out of the great murmur. 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, according to Foucault, language was 
assumed to be the medium through which all things were known. Knowledge 
was thought to be a process of speaking with increasing precision about a world in 
which words could correspond to things on a one-to-one basis. In the nineteenth 
century, as European linguists transformed language itself into an object of study, 
Foucault notes the rise of distinct ways of using language. Scientific symbolic logic 
uses language, much as in the preceding centuries, to construct representations 
of observed phenomena. Literature, however, develops certain ways of playing 
with language that reject the use of language to represent or investigate observed 
objects, including language itself.36 Most novelists, poets, and songwriters put 
words together in ways that would have little meaning in a scientific journal and 
most scientists put words together in ways that would be not be very meaning-
ful in a poetry anthology. They can use the same words, even the same sentences, 
drawn from the same murmur of language, but they are not saying the same 
things. Given their vocations, they do not have access to the same statements, and 
Foucault works to delineate and track these different ways of speaking.
Visibilities can be thought of in much the same way as statements. Irreduc-
ible to visible objects or scenes, visibilities are the ways in which those objects and 
scenes are visible. In Deleuze’s reading, Foucault rejects the notion that seeing 
is an unmediated activity. People cannot look at an object or scene and see it as 
absolutely anything; we see what we think can be seen. For light, reflecting from 
an object, to be seen as a ball or, reflecting from a scene, to be seen as a riot, balls 
and riots must be thinkable. Most people do not see aliens when they look into the 
same night sky as those who report UFO sightings. Much as statements seem to 
35  Ibid., 52–56.
36  Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1994), 294–300. First published in French as Les Mots et les choses, by Editions Gal-
limard, 1966.
Bible and thus witnesses to the reality revealed in Jesus only as guided by Scrip-
ture.29 To summarize, revelation is mediated to us by Scripture, which is mediated 
to us by proclamation, while proclamation is authorized by Scripture, which is 
authorized by revelation.
It is now, finally, possible to meaningfully discuss how Barth relates dog-
matic theology to proclamation, the Word of God preached, and therefore to gain 
a better understanding of Morse’s notion of testing the spirits and the task of aca-
demic theology today. For Barth, theology is by no means a capturing or catalogu-
ing of God and God’s attributes within systems of human language.30 Rather, it is 
a critical study of proclamation. It is not the source of proclamation, but instead 
seeks to test the coherence of proclamation to the Word of God as it has been 
received in other times and places.31 Theology is by no means a foolproof corrective 
to false proclamation and its success is not marked by a renewed understanding 
of the Word of God, but instead by a sense of uneasiness about the potential for 
proclamation to go astray from its commission to witness faithfully to the Word of 
God. It is, therefore, an open-ended task that is itself subject to continual testing,32 
as Morse also recognizes.33 How, though, can we think of these false spirits or false 
proclamation that Barth and Morse would have theology challenge?
It is in further exploring this critical function of theology that Foucault 
will be particularly helpful. The central task of dogmatic theology seems to be an 
investigation of a gap or discontinuity between the Word of God and at least some 
of the words that claim to bear God’s Word. Such discontinuities between human 
words and the things to which they seem to refer are prevalent objects of study in 
Foucault’s work. In order to focus the disparate sites of Foucault’s investigation on 
this theme of discontinuity, I will organize my discussion of Foucault through ref-
erence to Gilles Deleuze’s Foucault, which includes a trio of essays on precisely this 
theme under the heading “Topology: ‘Thinking Otherwise’.” As Deleuze offers a 
fairly abstract distillation of works that were tied to studies of particular situations, 
I will punctuate my explication of Deleuze’s reading of Foucault with Foucault’s 
own writings on those situations as such connections seem helpful.
In Foucault, Deleuze suggests that Foucault’s investigations into history 
were to a great extent inquiries into ways of seeing and ways of saying in particular 
times (particularly in Europe). Deleuze refers to these ways of seeing as “visibili-
ties” and to ways of saying as “statements.”34 Before discussing the discontinuity 
between these visibilities and their corresponding statements, between ways of 
seeing and speaking about what seem to be the same objects, it will be helpful to 
more clearly explain what statements and visibilities are and what they are not.
29  Ibid., 108–111, 145–146.
30  Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Volume I.1, 136–137.
31  Ibid., 48.
32  Ibid., 73.
33  Christopher Morse, Not Every Spirit, 34.
34  Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans. Seán Hand, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1988), 48. First published in French by Les Éditions de Minuit, 1986.
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mania was explained in relation to these ideas, by bodily fluids that are semi-gas-
eous and insufficiently restricted in their movements around the body and brain 
and by nerve fibers that are taut and dry. Mania’s behavioral symptoms included 
inattention to cold and erratic physical gestures.40 The psychiatrists studied by 
Foucault were guided in understanding their observations by the ideas of melan-
cholia and mania. From out of the many observations that could have been made 
about these people, the psychiatrists saw as coherent illnesses those behaviors and 
characteristics that were compatible with these organizing ideas. Perception was 
shaped by articulable concepts, but not in abstraction from those in whom mad-
ness seemed to manifest. Rather, “the madman’s body was regarded as the visible 
and solid presence of his disease.”41
Madness and those with whom it is associated are different objects: madness 
is an articulable idea, while people are, on the level of visual observation, material 
objects. However, these different objects, come together, such that a person can 
come to be seen as not just a person, but as a mad person. Statements and vis-
ibilities, our ways of speaking and seeing, come together, despite lacking common 
objects. When we speak, we are restricted by the objects we perceive and seek to 
speak about. However, our very perception of those objects is shaped by the speech 
of others.42 Words, before we have the chance to speak them, reach out to capture 
the objects we see. How does this happen, though, in such a way that we come to 
believe that we rightly see a crazy person?
Visibilities and statements, the elements of knowledge, do not come always 
together haphazardly. Instead, knowledge is molded in institutions and is shaped 
by power.43 Before applying Foucault’s insights to the theological thoughts of 
Barth and Morse, I will briefly discuss Foucault’s notion of power and its relation 
to knowledge-shaping institutions. As Foucault lays it out in a well-known passage 
in The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, power is marked by several qualities that dif-
fer from the ways in which power is often spoken of. In the context of his book’s 
examination of the ways in which sexuality has been regulated socially, Foucault 
argues that power is not held by individuals or groups, but is a matter of relations 
between them. It is not external to relationships, but is the effect of inequalities in 
relationships and produces inequalities. Power is not impressed upon smaller units, 
such as businesses or schools, by larger units. Instead, the relations of inequality 
that thrive in businesses or schools sustain the larger-scale dynamics of inequality 
in entire societies. Finally, power relations are “both intentional and nonsubjec-
tive.” The actions that result from and sustain these inequalities in relationships 
work toward the end of sustaining these inequalities. This is not to say, however, 
that there is a mastermind or sinister cabal directing all the relationships that con-
stitute power. Instead, like statements, power arises from a great murmur, guiding 
40  Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization, 117–131.
41  Ibid., 159.
42  Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, 65–68.
43  Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, 75–77.
precede our speaking them and do not originate from us as seeing subjects, visibili-
ties shape how we see.37 I take this notion of sight to be theoretically inclusive of 
other forms of sensory perception, though Foucault himself focused on the visual. 
It would seem, though, that we similarly hear or taste as, such that these insights 
would not apply only to seeing people.
To a great extent, statements and visibilities together compose human 
knowledge. We know, on some level, that which we sense or speak about. Most 
importantly, for this paper, common sense (or perhaps simply the mechanics of 
the English language, though French was Foucault’s native tongue) would suggest 
that if I see a light in the sky and say to a child, “Look, a star,” that I have seen 
and spoken about the same thing. Knowledge seems to involve the smooth input 
and output of the same information in different forms. By Deleuze’s estimation, 
though, Foucault denies that the object of one’s senses and the object of one’s 
words are one and the same.38 If I say to a child, “Look, a star,” I intend my words 
to direct the child’s attention to the object I see. My words, however, in fact refer 
to an idea of a star and not the object that I see. My words, in a sense, have at-
tempted to reach out and capture that shining object as a “star,” rather than as a 
flying saucer or an angel.
Foucault illuminates this gap between seeing and speaking early in his 
career, in Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. Ex-
amining the development of the understanding and diagnosis of melancholia and 
mania in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Foucault argues:
The essential thing is that the enterprise did not proceed from observa-
tion to the construction of explanatory images; that on the contrary, 
the images assured the initial role of synthesis, that their organizing 
force made possible a structure of perception, in which at last the 
symptoms could attain their significant value and be organized as the 
visible presence of the truth.39
Ideas structured by words played the definitive part in understanding and 
diagnosing the psychiatric conditions of melancholia and mania, such that visual 
observations were interpreted in accordance with these ideas, and were not the 
origin of these ideas. Melancholia, as an idea, came into the seventeenth century in 
association with coldness, darkness, and heaviness. Over these centuries, melan-
cholia was variously explained by an overabundance of cold, dark, and thick black 
bile in the body, the failure of overly thick, heavy blood to circulate to the brain, 
and the sluggish vibration of excessively damp nerve fibers. Melancholia’s behav-
ioral symptoms ranged from lethargy to isolation from others. The idea of mania, 
by contrast, was associated with heat, dryness, and excitability. Like melancholia, 
37  Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, 52–57.
38  Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, 61–63.
39  Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1988), 135. Translated from the abridged edition of Histoire de la Folie, 
first published in French by Librarie Plon, 1961.
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by naming their objects as sinful or turning certain people away from the com-
munion table. This shaping can be done implicitly, as well, when a preacher simply 
does not speak on a certain issue or regularly links certain biblical characters who 
are perceived as capable, righteous, etc. to certain people or groups in the world.
These shaped ways of seeing then affect the actions of the congregation. 
Congregants who are healthcare providers may act differently to the apparently 
sinful than to the apparently righteous. In their interactions with social services, 
congregants may advocate effectively for themselves or fail to do so depending on 
whether or not they view their needs (e.g., living in a situation of intimate violence) 
as resulting from their own sinful behavior or that of others. Congregants who are 
teachers may act differently to the apparently capable and the apparently needy. 
As a congregation or even as a denomination, entire ministries may be shaped by 
these ways of seeing. These ministerial decisions include who can be married, who 
can be ordained as a minister, where and among whom church buildings should 
be placed, and what stance churches should take regarding mass incarceration or 
immigration law. Foucault opens up this way of seeing the power relations that are 
tied to preaching.
With this understanding of preaching in view, Barth can be read as sug-
gesting that dogmatic theology is the task of criticizing this shaping of perception 
by preachers and as pointing to the criterion by which such criticism should make 
its judgments. The criterion of proclamation, for Barth, is the Word of God. The 
Word of God, as both the speech and act of God, is “not merely, or even primar-
ily, the object of human perception.”46 Reading Barth through Foucault, then, 
preaching is to be judged by the extent to which it is speech shaped by the Word 
of God rather than speech seeking to capture the Word of God as an object of 
perception. The task of a theologian is, then, to ask, “Is this the Word of God that 
I hear or read being preached?” From this guiding question, three more narrowly 
focused questions seem particularly useful for the critical work of theology, in 
Barth’s sense.
First, in speech that claims to be proclamation, is God’s Word being 
witnessed to as the speech and act of God or is an attempt being made to cap-
ture God’s Word through human words? According to Barth, the Word of God 
is simultaneously God’s speech and God’s act, while human words are separated 
from our acts. Like Foucault, Barth recognizes that the objects of human words do 
not match up with the objects perceived by humans. We can intend our words to 
direct others to our acts, but such direction is an attempted shaping of the percep-
tion of our acts by those others. As God’s speech is God’s act, however, there is no 
such gap into which power can insinuate itself. Insofar as there is a gap between 
speech and act in the supposed Word of God to which proclamation points, God 
is not speaking through this proclamation as when, for example, God’s healing 
and saving action is preached as dependent upon the actions of a human figure of 
authority, upon the acceptance of certain beliefs by a preacher’s audience, or upon 
their monetary donations.
46  Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Volume I.1, 88.
the actions of those who stand in positions of privilege in various relationships 
without clearly originating from any.44
In this last sense, in particular, one can see that the mechanics of power 
could mesh with the gears of statements and visibilities. Power relations become 
entrenched in society through the shaping of knowledge in institutions. Through 
institutions, such as the state, power relations are brought in line with each other, 
such that there comes to be a pattern that links power relations across society: as 
an example, men have advantages over women in US workplaces partly because 
institutions in this country (e.g. family, schools) promote locally performed ways 
of seeing and speaking about women as less suited to success in workplaces (as less 
assertive or career oriented, for example), and these ways of seeing and speaking 
shape individual relations between workers, managers, and employers. Deleuze 
clarifies the nature and role of institutions:
There is no immediate global integration [of power relations]. There 
is, rather, a multiplicity of local and partial integrations, each one 
entertaining an affinity with certain relations or particular points. The 
integrating factors or agents of stratification make up institutions: not 
just the State, but also the Family, Religion, Production, the Market-
place, Art itself, Morality, and so on. The institutions are not sources 
or essences, and have neither essence nor interiority. They are practices 
or operating mechanisms which do not explain power, since they pre-
suppose its relations and are content to ‘fix’ them, as part of a function 
that is not productive but reproductive. There is no State, only state 
control, and the same holds for all other cases.45
Institutions (e.g., the family) change over time as the practices of knowledge 
that constitute them (e.g., parenting) change. Such institutions reproduce the power 
relations which shape them through the ways of seeing and speaking that provide 
them with a sense of coherence. It is in considering proclamation as the knowledge 
shaping practice that defines the institution of the church that the insights of Fou-
cault can be applied to the theological work of Barth and, in turn, Morse.
Foucault, particularly as read by Deleuze, demonstrates that through the gap 
between their objects, ways of speaking shape ways of seeing and, in doing so, en-
trench relations of inequality. Proclamation can be thought of in this way. When 
a preacher speaks, either in the context of preaching or the administration of 
sacraments, his or her words can shape the perceptions of his or her congregation. 
Particular humans, groups, or even the earth itself can be made to appear righ-
teous or sinful, capable or needy, trustworthy or deceitful, important or unworthy 
of consideration, desirable or revolting. Preachers can do this shaping explicitly, 
44  Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, trans. Robert Hurley, (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1990), 92–96. First published in French as La Volenté de savoir, by Editions Gal-
limard, 1976.
45  Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, 75.
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the spirits that come to them in Christian doctrine. The call to challenge preach-
ing that would promote or reproduce these exploitation-propagating institutions 
follows from Morse’s denial of those things that are not from God, but that would 
claim our allegiance. Finally, in turning to my teacher for guidance I hope that I 
have demonstrated, if not explicitly theorized, the importance of the communal 
nature of this theological task of faithful disbelief.
Second, in speech that claims to be proclamation, whose speech is shaping 
the perceptions of the audience? For both Foucault and Barth, words can have the 
power to shape those who hear them. Deleuze uses the term visibilities to encapsu-
late Foucault’s thoughts about the ways of perceiving that are shaped. Barth writes 
in terms of old and new humans: those whose perceptions of the world are shaped 
by human words and the Word of God, respectively, not that any of us live fully 
as new humans. In criticizing proclamation, then, theologians can ask whether the 
words of the preacher reflect ways of speaking that are reproduced by the institu-
tions that have shaped the preacher, and that he or she now reproduces, or new 
ways of speaking that may reflect the Word of God, ways of speaking that are 
productive of something new and not simply reproductive of the old.
Third, in speech that claims to be proclamation, what kinds of institutional-
ized power relations are being supported, reproduced, or produced, and which are 
being challenged? Foucault writes of power relations in terms of inequality and of 
institutions that take these inequalities and propagate them, promoting widespread 
patterns of exploitation in which some humans are placed above others. Insofar as 
we can understand the Word of God as shaping power relations between humans, 
it would not be in terms of these human inequalities. The only inequality implied 
in the coming of the Word of God to humanity is the inequality between a God 
who can heal and humans who need to be healed. Theologians can ask, then, 
whether a preacher promotes institutions and associated power relations that place 
some humans above others, or institutions and power relations that would place all 
humans in relations of healing with God.
For now, then, I argue that asking such questions is what academic theolo-
gians do, particularly in the context of an educational system that seeks to capture 
all things within the ways of speaking and seeing reproduced by an exploitative 
global market. In each of these three questions, what is required of theologians 
is both a looking toward the Word of God as witnessed to in various times and 
places, and an analysis of the interactions of power and knowledge in the act of 
proclamation. Each of these investigative tasks, as well as their synthesis, would 
necessarily be open-ended, given that theologians are not, by any means, those 
who most clearly hear the Word of God, but are so often those who most easily 
succeed in the very academic, economic, and ecclesial institutions that would seek 
to capture the Word of God and those who would hear it.
Lest I lose sight of what guided me to this way of thinking about the task of 
theology, I conclude by expressing my hope that this kind of critical theological in-
quiry embodies that testing of spirits that is characterized by Christopher Morse’s 
faithful disbelief. The call to challenge the separation of God’s speech from God’s 
act is an extension of Morse’s rejection of false comfort of the sort that was offered 
to Rachel. Just as Rachel refused to believe that God’s healing would come in the 
form of empty consolation in the midst of evil, theologians can deny those words 
that would squelch lament and seek any consolation short of the healing power 
displayed in the Resurrection. The call to challenge the shaping of human perspec-
tives by institutions that coordinate exploitative power relations rather than by a 
healing God, is inspired by Morse’s insistence that theologians test the origin of 
